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Essentially, Charles D. Stanton’s Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean is a
military history of medieval Sicily. While the book’s chronological span is marked by the
Arab conquest of the island in the ninth century and the passing of Norman Sicily into
the hands of the Hohenstaufen dynasty in the late twelfth century, Stanton’s narrative
concentrates on the naval activities of the Normans in their attempts to conquer and keep
the island in the intervening centuries. One basic assumption guides the book’s argu-
ment: Sicily’s geographical position in the center of the Mediterranean permitted its rul-
ers to exercise economic control over most of the basin. With this in mind, Stanton turns
Sicily into a military asset and therefore imposes purpose on all Norman military activ-
ity in southern Italy. From the very outset, Stanton’s Normans were “mercenaries bent
on conquest” who saw the acquisition of southern Italy as a means to secure the central
Mediterranean: “they had horses, they had hauberks, and they were there to stay” (27).
One problem with the maritime teleology of this argument is that the Normans were not
very maritime to begin with and that, as Stanton explains in the introduction, their na-
val abilities had to be acquired in the process of conquering Sicily. It is one thing to con-
quer territory but quite another to view oneself as future rulers of the Mediterranean
without actually knowing the first thing about naval warfare. Stanton’s implied argument—
that the conquest of Sicily gave rise to the Normans’ future naval expertise—is much more
compelling.
Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean is divided into four chapters, the first
three of which treat the rise and decline of Norman Sicily, while the last chapter evaluates
the historical impact of the Normans’ presence on the Mediterranean island. Chapter 1,
“The Conquest,” actually tells the story of two conquests: the island’s subjugation first
by the Arabs and then by the Normans. Although the various naval confrontations are
meticulously described and evaluated, the opening chapter’s penchant for military idiom
generates an unflatteringly anachronistic representation of the North Africans. And so,
the Arab and Berber population of southern Italy is repeatedly referred to as “Saracen,”
as in “open discord among the ‘Saracens’ of Sicily” (23). Surely, most of these references
stem from the chronicle sources used by Stanton, yet occasionally one has the impression
that this chapter absorbs some of the cruder elements of the source material, so that the
reader frequently encounters “Muslim marauders” (18) and learns that Roger de Hauteville
“drove the marauders into the sea” (26) and his brother Robert “cut off his prey com-
pletely” (41), whereas “the Muslim emir ended up at the bottom of the harbor” (26). In
a narrative that is not in the least concerned with religious differences and cultural iden-
tities it can be distracting to see North Africans repeatedly defined as “Muslims” whereas
the clearly differentiated Europeans are rarely if ever called “Christians.” Ironically, one
chronicler refers to the Normans as “we” and to their North African enemies simply as
“the Sicilians” (36).
Chapter 2, “The Apogee,” discusses the heyday of the Norman kingdom of Sicily un-
der the Hautevilles. Again, the book’s strength lies in the intelligent and informed dissec-
tion of naval operations. In fact, the clarity of Stanton’s prose and his incisive analyses
make the complex reconstruction of military operations from often fragmented and bi-
ased sources appear effortless. This chapter presents the various military undertakings of
the Normans in the Mediterranean, in Greece, and in North Africa as a series of endeav-
ors to consolidate and expand their control of the region.
In the third chapter, “The Eclipse,” the reader witnesses how the next generation of
Hautevilles deployed their naval prowess across the entire region: in the span of only
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fourteen years, William II staged military operations in the Balearics, Greece, Asia Minor,
Cyprus, and the Levant, stretching Norman resources from the very west to the very east
of the Mediterranean. Here, the decline of Norman maritime power is blamed on poor
military decisions, bungled naval operations, and quixotic expeditions. Although the analy-
sis of the numerous military campaigns is sound and even trenchant at times, the one-
dimensional representation of everything that is not military—coupled with a linear nar-
rative of conquest, rise, and decline—creates the impression that cultural, political, and
economic developments can be reduced to a set of military policies. For instance, Stanton
maintains that Roger II’s flourishing, wealthy, and multicultural Sicily solely rested on three
(military) pillars: “(1) the consolidation of his reign on the mainland in the face of a re-
bellious nobility … (2) the defense of the realm against Byzantine designs and (3) the ex-
pansion of Norman power on the Maghrib coast of North Africa” (67). I do not wish to
deny that these policies were important for the Norman tenure of Sicily, but surely the
decision not to suppress the island’s multiethnic population—consisting mostly of Arabs,
Berbers, and Greeks—must be counted among one of the Normans’ most remarkable stra-
tegic feats. And when Robert de Hauteville appoints a Norman knight as amiratus in
Salerno, Stanton states that the choice of the traditional Arabic title (“emir”) was “merely
… a palliative for his new Muslim subjects” (46). The mobility and adaptability of Norman
identity—Normannitas—has emerged as an important area in the field over the last ten
years, and it would have inflected Stanton’s narrative with a valuable political and cul-
tural dimension.
The final chapter assesses the long-term impact of the Norman presence in Sicily. Once
more, the criteria are exclusively military, even though the consequences belong to grand
récit: “The rise of Norman sea power in the central Mediterranean … irrevocably trans-
formed the geopolitical and economic impetus on the sea and gave it a decided tilt to the
West” (223). Given the Normans’ multipolar policies of occasional alliances with North
African polities and their incessant feuding with Venice, Byzantium, the papacy, and the
German empire, this sweeping statement sits uneasily with such monolithic and arguably
anachronistic markers as “West” and “East.” What, exactly, is meant by “West” and
“Western” at a time when Arabs and Greeks produced works for a Norman king?
As a military history, Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean is a learned and
carefully researched book. Its most important contribution to the field is its masterful as-
similation of numerous, not always accessible, chronicles and sources originally com-
posed in French, Greek, Latin, and Arabic. In fact, the density of these sources through-
out the book is staggering: with almost 1,700 footnotes spread over only 280 pages, the
average page features no less than six footnotes. Conceptually the book’s contribution is
not as fully developed as it might have been. Fundamentally Stanton stops short of pro-
posing a Norman thalassocracy, yet much of the book charts the emergence of a small,
yet influential maritime empire. Perhaps a more encouraging view of the Mediterranean
not as a theater of war but as a connecting sea—such as the model proposed by Peregrine
Horden and Nicholas Purcell in The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History
(2000)—might offer a fuller context in which to explore Stanton’s argument.
Sebastian Sobecki, University of Groningen
Karen Sullivan, The Inner Lives of Medieval Inquisitors. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2011. Pp. xi, 296. $45. ISBN: 9780226781679. doi:10.1017/S0038713413000456
In this remarkable literary analysis of medieval inquisitors’ writings, Karen Sullivan ex-
plores the range of conceptual frameworks through which seven different men inter-
preted the relationship between their professional office and Christian love. Pointing to
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